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“Corruption by organised crime” – a matter of definition? 
Liz Campbell 
Redraft, May 2016. 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
The phenomenon of “corruption by organised crime” is the subject of increased 
attention from policy makers in the UK. This focus is notable, given the limited political 
and academic consideration of the scope and meaning of this intersecting term.  
 
Both “organised crime” and “corruption” are difficult notions to pin down, definitionally 
and empirically, and such complexity is compounded by their conjunction. In this paper I 
problematise the dominant conceptualisation of “corruption by organised crime”, and 
suggest that it is questionable in an abstract as well as operational sense. Given the 
ambiguity of the constituent concepts, as well as the implications for the development 
of criminal justice policy and law, I call for caution in its use. Instead I propose that we 
refer, and thus respond, to specific manifestations of corrupt practices for different 
criminal ends. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
“Corruption by organised crime” 1 now is on the political radar in the UK. Once regarded 
as a foreign concern,2 or something that relates to policing predominantly,3 corruption 
by organised crime is coming to occupy a more obvious position in political discourse 
and in policy documents.4 This growing domestic focus echoes the attention paid at the 
global level. The European Commission emphasises the “social harm” caused by 
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1
 Home Office, Serious and Organised Crime Strategy (Cm 8715, 2013) para 6.40. 
2
 Home Office, One Step Ahead: A 21
st
 Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime (Cm 6167, 2004) 10 
and 20; The Scottish Parliament, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (Brussels Bulletin, Issue 86, April 2013) 
<http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_EuropeanandExternalRelationsCommittee/Brussells%20Bulletin/I
ssue_86__April_2013_(pdf_295_KB).pdf> at 9, accessed 9 May 2016; National Crime Agency, National 
Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2014 (National Crime Agency, 2014) 4. For an 
assessment of the moral ambivalence of the UK when it comes to bribery overseas see Jeremy Horder, 
‘On Her Majesty’s Commercial Service: Bribery, Public Officials and the UK Intelligence Services’ (2011) 74 
MLR 911-931. 
3
 See Joel Miller, Police Corruption in England and Wales: An Assessment of Current Evidence (Home 
Office Online Report 11/03, 2003). 
4
 See Scottish Parliament Justice Committee, 37th Meeting, 1 December, 2004, para 2.7; The Serious 
Organised Crime Taskforce, Letting Our Communities Flourish – A Strategy for Tackling Serious Organised 
Crime in Scotland (The Scottish Government, 2009) paras 47 and 48; Home Office (n 1) para 6.40; HM 
Government, UK Anti-Corruption Plan (Stationery Office 2014) para 2.1. 
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“organised crime groups us[ing] corruption to commit other serious crimes, such as 
trafficking in drugs and human beings”,5 while the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime calls for the criminalisation of corruption and the 
adoption of measures to address it,6 and the Preamble to the UN Convention against 
Corruption notes “the links between corruption and other forms of crime, in particular 
organised crime”.7  
 
Such attention obtains despite little consideration of the precise scope and meaning of 
the term “corruption by organised crime”. Clearly, both “organised crime” and 
“corruption” are difficult phenomena to identify and define, and such complexity is 
compounded by their conjunction. These nuances, as well as the implications for 
operational practice, underline the importance of understanding the term’s meaning as 
well as its limitations. 
 
In a general sense, we can imagine how corruption could benefit “organised crime”. As I 
explore more fully below, organised crime entails systematic, profit-driven criminality. 
While this may involve operations in illicit markets only and the reinvestment of profits 
back into these activities, we can also envisage interactions with legitimate systems of 
business and governance, such as in the form of corrupt practices. So, for example, 
corrupt connections and behaviours could facilitate the flow of information to organised 
crime groups (OCGs), be that about criminal competitors, state surveillance, 
investigation, or pending prosecution. Corruption might minimise the risk of detection 
and state intervention. It may prevent the group resorting to violence; and it may boost 
competitive advantage and thus ensure the survival and growth of the criminal 
enterprise. Moreover, as Elizabeth Rowe et al. stress, corruption may be used by OCGs 
as a consequence of enhanced legislative and law enforcement responses, which lead to 
a “tactical displacement effect”, such that organised criminals attempt to gain “insider 
knowledge” to reduce the risk of apprehension. 8  Overall, this compromising of 
individuals and entities for criminal benefit is a strategic manoeuvre by OCGs. 
 
In terms of its manifestations, corruption by organised crime might include the 
corruption of personnel with access to data systems; officers who are involved in border 
control, policing, prisons and prosecution services; administrators of such institutions 
who determine strategy and operational matters; managers in charge of procurement 
                                                        
5
 Commission, ‘Fighting Corruption in the EU’ (Communication) COM (2011) 308 final 3. Also see Council 
Resolution of 21 December 1998 on the prevention of organised crime with reference to the establishment 
of a comprehensive strategy for combating it (Official Journal C 408 of 29.12.1998); Commission, 
‘Developing a Strategic Concept on Tackling Organised Crime’ (Communication) COM (2005) 0232 final.  
  
6
 Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 25, annex I, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. 
No. 49, at 44, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001), Article 8. 
  
7
 Convention against Corruption, G.A. res. 58/4, UN Doc.A/58/422 (2003). 
  
8
 Elizabeth Rowe and others, Organised crime and public sector corruption: A crime scripts analysis of 
tactical displacement risks. Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice Issue 444 (Australian Institute 
of Criminology 2013). 
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of goods and services; the judiciary, witnesses, and the jury.9 Such corruption may be 
through the cultivation of an intimate or romantic relationship, by appealing to the ego 
of the corruptee, or through the ability of OCGs first to convince and then pressure or 
coerce the person. 
 
Beyond these various modes, we might agree that corruption by organised crime causes 
serious harm. As Sappho Xekanis claims, corruption by organised crime undermines 
crime control, state control of public bodies, and indeed the broader purpose of public 
bodies.10 The particular harms in organised crime itself lie in the commission by a group 
of systematic, serious criminality, to generate profit. The group element may assist in 
avoidance of detection due to subdivision of tasks, and ensures endurance of the 
enterprise. Coupled with this, the investigation and even conviction of some individuals 
may not compromise the arrangement as a whole, and commitment to the group 
implies that the offence is more likely to be completed.11 If the group does resort to 
violence, it has a ready cohort of members willing to act. Drawing on these factors, it 
seems that the implications of corruption by organised crime could be greater and 
graver than when corruption is committed by an individual.  
 
Furthermore, corruption by organised crime can range in form and level from sporadic 
acts of bribery through to wholesale state capture.12 Cyrille Fijnaut et al. identify three 
forms of criminal relationships with the “upper world”: parasitical, symbiotic and 
implantation.13 In the first instance, contact with the legal economy is limited and 
operates to benefit the “underworld” only. In terms of symbiosis, mutual interests are 
advanced, and corruption becomes more significant. And in an implantation scenario, 
the criminal group is included in the upper world and criminal and legitimate activities 
are intertwined. 
 
Notwithstanding this apparent consensus as to the gravity and multiplicity of forms of 
corruption by organised crime, little attention has been paid to the term itself, and to its 
conceptualisation. As I examine later, corruption involves a person in a trusted position 
or position of power abusing or facilitating the abuse of that position in return for 
personal and other gain. In the specific context of “corruption by organised crime” that 
abuse is by or for an OCG or member thereof, so as to benefit or advance the actions of 
that group. Here the OCG is acting as the corruptor, with the corrupted party an officer 
                                                        
9
 See e.g. Philip Gounev and Tihomir Bezlov, Examining the Links Between Organised Crime and 
Corruption (Center for the Study of Democracy, European Commission 2010). 
10
 Sappho Xenakis, ‘Organised Crime and the Corruption of Public Institutions in the United Kingdom: 
Implications for Policy and Practice’ in Penal Issues (CNRS-Ministère de la Justice, March 2013). 
11
 Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts: A Consultation Paper (Law Com CP No 183, 2007) para 
2.34. 
12
 Edgardo Buscaglia and others, ‘Undermining the Foundations of Organized Crime and Public Sector 
Corruption’ (2005) 114 Essays in Public Policy 21. 
13
 Cyrille JCF Fijnaut and others, Organized Crime in the Netherlands (Kluwer Law International 1998)  
(1998). 
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or individual. It is both conceptually and practically important to ascertain the 
parameters to the term as it is deployed currently, and to unpick why a certain meaning 
may be invoked in a given setting. Nonetheless, it is neither feasible nor useful to 
determine one fixed definition, whether that is operationally or legally. Rather, I will 
identify the ambiguities in the use and understanding of the term, and thus warn against 
any move towards its embedding, both with respect to criminal justice policy making 
and legislating.  
 
I begin the paper with a consideration of why definitions are significant, especially in the 
general criminal justice context. Next I attempt to unravel the conceptual and legal 
meanings of corruption and organised crime, before focusing on their intersection. My 
concern is not with some general definition of “corruption”, but with how that term 
could usefully be defined in the specific context of its use by “organised crime”. I 
examine the conceptual bases for our understanding of corruption, to determine 
whether it can involve private actors rather than hinging on public office. Then, in 
relation to organised crime, I explore whether corruption actually is a necessary 
component. Building on this, I consider how “corruption by organised crime” might be 
distinguished from cognate ideas like white-collar crime. Overall I question the term’s 
use, given its limited explanatory value, and reject any possible influence on the legal 
sphere. It is not contended that legislation is likely to be introduced - rather that there is 
a potential development here, predicated on a loose concept, both of which merit 
attention.  
 
 
2. The role of definitions  
 
Notwithstanding the evident concern with corruption by organised crime in the UK, very 
little consideration has been given to what the term means. In the scholarly context, 
more attention is paid to empirical assessments of the phenomenon14 and to possible 
responses15 than to the preceding step of definitions, though both elements are difficult 
to realise without such clarity. Corruption by organised crime is not addressed in any 
existing legislative provisions, and explanations in policy documents are scarce and 
limited.  
 
Definitions matter. How we depict and delineate a given phenomenon, in the criminal 
justice context or otherwise, both derives from and goes on to shape our understanding 
of it. Then the translation of our interpretation of a phenomenon into technical 
definitions has implications in terms of political and practitioner focus and resource 
allocation. Beyond this, the enactment of policy definitions into law fixes these political 
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 See e.g. Gounev and Ruggiero (n 9).  
15
 Liz Campbell, ‘Organised Crime and Corruption in the UK: Responding through Law’ [2016] Criminal 
Law Review 17, Sope Williams-Elegbe, Fighting Corruption in Public Procurement A Comparative Analysis 
of Disqualification or Debarment Measures (Hart Publishing 2012). 
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choices. These observations draw on the work of Carol Bacchi, who puts forward the 
view that policy makers shape social “problems” through the ways in which they speak 
about them and by means of the proposals suggested to “address” them. Her 
assessment of policy examines “what’s the problem represented to be?” and looks at 
how policy makers do not merely respond to social problems but act to construct them. 
This approach brings to the fore the overlooked implications of “problem 
representations”, given that “how we perceive or think about something will affect what 
we think ought to be done about it”.16 
 
My focus is on the presentation of a particular definition and characterisation of 
“corruption by organised crime”. Observations about the significance of definitions 
resonate particularly in respect of such behaviour, given that both of these elements 
generally occur clandestinely and ultimately comprise the types of behaviour that are 
looked for and acted against by policing powers. This is in contrast to some other crimes 
with more settled or obvious boundaries and manifestations. Here, the particular 
framing of the problem determines what is found, what is responded to, and how. This 
underlines the importance of our chosen parameters of corruption by organised crime 
and shows why their explicit articulation is so significant.    
 
Evidently, there is some tension in this respect, between more fluid and general policy 
definitions on the one hand and specified legal definitions on the other. In this vein, 
Edwards and Gill spoke of the dilemma between employing “elastic” concepts that can 
encompass a broad range of practices and thereby facilitate an understanding of how, 
and if, such practices are connected, and “inelastic” concepts that delimit the focus of 
inquiry to highly specific activities.17 So the content of definitions must differ according 
to the purpose for which they are used: policy statements can be looser as they serve to 
prompt and animate action, while law by its nature must be more precise.  
As the UK’s Anti-Corruption Plan emphasises, the criminal law is a key component in 
addressing corruption;18 indeed, this recalls Jeremy Horder’s persuasive defence of the 
crriminalisation of bribery on the basis of prevention of remote harms, as opposed to 
the adoption of civil measures against it.19 The significance of the criminal law is evident 
in the new offences of participation in a criminal organisation 20  and of police 
corruption,21  rather than manifesting in any proposed offence of “corruption by 
organised crime”. While the term appears in policy documents, it is not mentioned in 
statute books, and there is no drive to criminalise “corruption by organised crime” per 
                                                        
16
 Carol Lee Bacchi, Women, Policy and Politics: The Construction of Policy Problems, (SAGE Publications 
UK 1999) 1. 
17
 Adam Edwards and Pete Gill, ‘Crime as Enterprise? – The Case of “Transnational Organised Crime”’ 
(2002) 37 Crime, Law and Social Change 203, 204. 
18
 UK Anti-Corruption Plan (n 4) 16. 
   
19
 Jeremy Horder, ‘Bribery as a Form of Criminal Wrongdoing’ (2011) 127 LQR 37. 
20
 Serious Crime Act 2015, s 45.  
21
 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s 26.  
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se. Despite this, and while policy definitions and descriptions may be elastic, they still 
should reflect observable reality; this empirical link cannot be drawn without some 
degree of definitional certainty, or at the very least some deliberation. Moreover, the 
unreflective use of contestable terms in a policy context can give the illusion of 
certainty, be that to the public or to future policy makers or legislators. Fundamentally, 
it is difficult to have a sensible and informed debate about policy measures unless we 
know and can identify the problem at which they are aimed.  
 
3. Defining the elements  
 
The National Crime Agency (NCA), which leads and supports UK law enforcement in 
addressing organised crime, has described corruption by organised crime in its most 
recent National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime. The Assessment 
states: “in a serious and organised crime context corruption is defined as ‘the ability of 
an individual or group to pervert a process or function of an organisation to achieve a 
criminal goal’”.22 The NCA’s definition is broad, and understandably so, given its purpose 
and the context in which it was framed. There is no focus on public office, and either an 
individual or group can be the corruptor. The ultimate aim is a criminal act.  
 
Though there is value in this definition, it is not unproblematic. According to the NCA, 
such corruption is not constituted by an attempt or act to pervert a process, rather the 
mere ability to do so. Grounding the meaning of corruption on the ability of an 
individual or group, rather than an attempt or act, suggests more than an inchoate 
aspect.23 On the one hand, this breadth is plausible in a proactive policing context where 
the aim is to disrupt criminal groups and to intervene earlier rather than later, as 
embodied in the “Pursue” and “Prevent” strands of the Serious and Organised Crime 
Strategy. 24  Disruption and deterrence are part of the counter-organised crime 
landscape, and inchoate offenses are central to organised crime prosecutions.25 On the 
other hand, I suggest that focusing on mere ability is too remote. Surely the wrong lies 
in the corrupting action, or in an attempt to so act, not in the mere capacity or potential 
to do so. It seems unlikely that one could ascertain clearly which parties have this 
ability; indeed, almost all natural persons could commit all manner of crimes or acts. 
One may argue that the NCA’s definition is helpful in its emphasis on the process or 
function of corruption, not on a one-off event. It draws attention to the locus of power, 
and prompts us to consider from where this ability derives. Nonetheless, such positive 
                                                        
22
 National Crime Agency, National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2015 (National 
Crime Agency, 2015) para [117].  
  
23
 See Peter Ramsay, The Insecurity State: Vulnerable Autonomy and the Right to Security in the Criminal 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 142 et seq.   
  
24
 Home Office (n 1) 27-52. 
  
25
 See consideration of s45 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 below, p17. 
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elements do not allay concerns about the breadth of the definition, which mean it is 
both over-inclusive and less than meaningful.   
 
Notably, the NCA focuses on “a process or function of an organisation”. This could be 
criticised on the basis that corruption in fact may not compromise an organisation, but 
instead challenges the integrity of an individual office holder or State entity. However, 
one could argue that the definition accommodates this, insofar as the individual 
concerned may be carrying out “a process or function of an organisation”, if we 
interpret the latter broadly. Moreover, this lends weight to the idea that corruption 
should be criminal, or at least the focus of criminal justice agencies, only when it 
implicates some process or function of an organisation, rather than pertaining to 
personal relationships and dealings. Furthermore, this statement strays from the 
traditional understanding of corruption as relating to a particular position or power, 
though does not exclude it explicitly. So, while the NCA provides a useful starting point 
in conceptualising corruption by organised crime, the definition is incomplete.  
 
Identifying any sustainable meanings of “corruption by organised crime” requires a 
closer look at its constituent components. Invoking this term rests on the presumption 
that we know (or indeed could ever know) what corruption and organised crime mean. 
Both corruption and organised crime themselves are contested notions, with manifold 
understandings. Coupling the two can only amplify this complexity. Crucially, their 
meanings in policy circles do not match scholarly conceptualisations, which differ again 
from legal definitions. The mismatch operates in different ways; while a legal definition 
may be more expansive so as to enable effective police and prosecutorial action, it may 
be more limited if it centres on a certain mode of action or state of mind. For instance, 
as I explain more fully later, the legal definition of “serious organised crime” in Scotland 
is broader than most popular and scholarly interpretations of that term, while the legal 
definition of bribery, while often seen as an analogue to “corruption”, is more restrictive 
than the latter concept.  
 
I now turn to unpack and distinguish the meanings of both terms, drawing on both 
theoretical and legal considerations.   
 
a. Corruption  
 
The term “corruption” denotes a multiplicity of actions and understandings. In the legal 
sense, it is narrow and ill-defined, and does not constitute a standalone criminal 
offence. Conceptually, it has various definitional bases, turning on public opinion, public 
office and public interest. Then in terms of its wrong, there are two competing schools 
of thought, one focusing on the principal and agent relationship, and the other on the 
creation of a market where one ought not to exist.  
 
In examining these different dimensions, I do not propose a new or uniform definition of 
corruption, but rather make two claims that are relevant in mapping possible outlines of 
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“corruption by organised crime”. First I argue that the inclusion in political discourse of 
what could be deemed “private corruption” (that is corruption of a private party by 
another private party) is defensible, and second, that both conceptual models sustain 
this interpretation. These conclusions enable the characterisation of a range of 
problematic actions as corrupt, while maintaining the connection to the core wrong of 
the compromising of a trusted position or position of power.  
 
Corruption generally is understood as the abuse of public power for private profit or for 
a gain in power or status.26 This gain in profit, power or status can be on the part of the 
corrupter, or the corrupted, or both. Though it often intersects with fraudulent 
behaviour, or may involve extortion, corruption is analytically (and legally) distinct from 
these wrongs.27 The term encompasses a range of qualitatively distinct activities, such 
as bribery, where payments are demanded or expected in return for the operation of 
legitimate business practices; electoral corruption, where payments are made to acquire 
or maintain political influence; as well as the use of public office for personal gain, and 
nepotism, where one’s family is favoured in business or employment. So, while the 
terms bribery and corruption are often used interchangeably,28 the latter is a broader 
overarching concept of which bribery is one manifestation.29  
 
Crucially, corruption is not necessarily criminal, and conceiving of corruption as illegality 
is “simultaneously too narrow and too broad”: 30 an illegal act is not necessarily corrupt, 
and vice versa.31 Indeed, there are kinds of corruption that are not criminal in English or 
Scottish law, such as nepotism and the asynchronous doings of favours, which is typical 
of cronyism.32 In a moral or ethical sense, we tend to reserve the label “corruption” for 
those forms of influence that are at least prima facie dubious. To that extent, corruption 
is a morally loaded concept. Having said this, what is conceived of as corrupt is 
temporally, culturally and jurisdictionally contingent. We can imagine some situations 
where corruption, particularly bribery, is a means to a morally justifiable end, and where 
the contingent context shapes our judgment. So, for instance, the bribing of a 
concentration camp guard to facilitate escape might formally constitute corruption but 
                                                        
26
 JS Nye, ‘Corruption and Political Development: A Cost Benefit Analysis’ (1967) 61 American Political 
Science Review 417; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption. A Study in Political Economy (Academic Press, 
1978); Transparency International, Corruption In The UK: Part One – National Opinion Survey 
(Transparency International, 2013) 14.  
27
 See Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (Law Com CP No 185, 2007) para 1.31.  
28
 Nicholas Lord, Regulating Corporate Bribery in International Business (Ashgate 2014) 15. 
   
29
  Recognition of this may be seen in the shift in focus from the Corruption Bill 2003 to the Bribery Bill 
2010. 
30
 John G Peters and Susan Welch, ‘Political Corruption in America: A Search for Definitions and a Theory’ 
(1978) 78 American Political Science Review 974, 974-75. 
   
31
 See John Noonan, Bribes (University of California Press 1984).  
   
32
 Peter Alldridge, ‘The UK Bribery Act: “The Caffeinated Younger Sibling of the FCPA”’ (2012) 73 Ohio 
State Law Journal 1181, 1184. 
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would not be seen as be seen as morally problematic.33 Furthermore, some corruption 
may be regarded as functional, insofar as its results serve a beneficial purpose.34 An 
example of this would be the bribing of officials to facilitate economically or socially 
beneficial projects, like the construction of infrastructure. This implies that while 
corruption might still be morally and legally questionable it is sometimes, on balance, 
beneficial. So we can see that corruption is a malleable notion, reflecting a particular 
ideological stance and with variable consequences.   
 
Furthermore, as intimated above, there is no offence of corruption per se and no 
statutory definition of corruption in the UK.35 Despite the significance of the adverb 
“corruptly” in the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889-1916, there was no definition or 
explanation in those Acts. And while the Bribery Act 2010 repealed and replaced these 
Acts, and applies to what may be viewed colloquially as corruption, it has moved away 
from the terminology of corruption to bribery, which is a narrower notion. In terms of 
case law, the House of Lords described “corruptly” in respect of the Corrupt Practices 
Prevention Act 1854 as meaning “not ‘dishonestly,’ but in purposely doing an act which 
the law forbids as tending to corrupt”.36 This is a notably self-referential explanation. A 
rather optimistic view was put forward in R v Wellburn where the Court of Appeal stated 
that  
Nothing is to be gained by using variations for statutory words in ordinary usage 
unless the context so requires and it does not do so in the 1906 [Prevention of 
Corruption] Act. A jury will have no difficulty in deciding whether an accused has 
corruptly accepted or obtained a gift.37  
 
Despite concerns about the circular definition, one of its benefits (which may lead us to 
believe that the circularity is intentional) is that it gives conceptual discretion to juries. 
This is in keeping with the general trend in statutory interpretation at the time, namely 
that “the meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is not a question of 
law”.38 As I discuss below, this embeds “public opinion” in defining corruption.   
 
More recently, efforts have been made in a number of electoral court decisions to 
ascertain what constitutes corruption.39 These cases concerned the Representation of 
                                                        
   
33
 It is worth recalling section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 which allows the authorisation of 
(and thus renders legally unproblematic) actions done in the services of the Crown, which may or may not 
be morally dubious.  
34
 See Nathanial H Leff, ‘Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption’ (1964) 8 American 
Behavioural Scientist 8. 
35
 See Liz Campbell, ‘Organised Crime and Corruption in the UK: Responding Through Law’ [2016] Crim 
LR 20-36.  
36
 Cooper v Slade (1858) 6 HL Cas. 746, 773. That definition was adopted and followed by the Court of 
Criminal Appeal in R v Smith [1960] 2 QB 423, 429 in relation to the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 
1889. 
37
 (1979) 69 Cr App R 254, 264-265; followed in R v J (P) [2013] EWCA Crim 2287. 
   
38
 Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854, 861. 
39
 See eg Erlam v Rahman [2015] EWHC 1215 (QB); Ali v Bashir [2013] EWHC 2572 (QB).  
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the People Act 1983 which provides that a person shall be guilty of a “corrupt practice” 
if he commits, or aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of the offence of 
personation,40 if he is guilty of bribery,41 or of “treating” (providing food, drink or 
entertainment).42 Again, part of this Act is unhelpful in its circularity, in that it makes the 
finding of “corrupt practices” dependent on other offences, such as bribery, and 
circularity is evident where the corrupt practices are defined by reference to the adverb 
“corruptly”.43 Indeed, the High Court in Erlam v Rahman stressed that “the whole 
scheme of corrupt and illegal practices and the arbitrary distinctions between the two 
should be reconsidered”.44   
 
Given the lack of meaningful assistance from this jurisprudence, I now explore 
Heidenheimer’s suggestion that our definition of corruption could be based on public 
opinion (that is, the popular understanding of corruption), or it could centre on public 
office (where corruption is departure from the duties of this office), or on the public 
interest (namely that which is harmed by corruption).45  
 
Corruption is sometimes defined and measured according to public opinion. Though far 
from a vox pop index, the perceptions of business people are key in terms of measuring 
corruption, in the methodology of Transparency International, for instance.46 Despite 
this prominence in respect of measuring corruption (which is not without its critics47), 
relying on public opinion in defining the issue is not without problems. Public opinion 
may be wilfully blind, especially if there is a functional benefit of the behaviour, and it 
runs the risk of being over- or under-inclusive in terms of what it categorises as 
corruption. Also, if corruption has amorality at its core, then which “public” are we 
talking about, and whose morality?  
 
As for the notion of public office, it is the violation of norms by such an office holder for 
private gain that is regarded as characterising corrupt acts.48 One could question the 
meaning and inclusion of private gain here, given that it is the compromising of the 
norms that is dubious. In this context it is worth recalling the offence of misconduct in 
public office,49 which is where a public officer acting as such, wilfully neglects to perform 
his duty and/or wilfully misconducts himself, to such a degree as to amount to an abuse 
                                                        
40
 s 60. 
41
 s 113. 
42
 s 114. 
43
 s 113(2)(b). 
44
 [2015] EWHC 1215 (QB) [667]. 
45
 AJ Heidenheimer, Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (Holt Rinehart and Winston 
1970).  
46
 See <http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview>.   
47
 Greg Michener, ‘Policy Evaluation via Composite Indexes: Qualitative Lessons from International 
Transparency Policy Indexes’ (2015) 74 World Development 184–196. 
48
 Heidenheimer (n 45) 227. 
49
 See Campbell (n 35).  
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of the public’s trust in the office holder, without reasonable excuse or justification.50 
The centrality of public office and public trust is evident in this offence, which concerns 
what could be called “corruption”.51 There is no mention of gain or profit. In a broader 
conceptual sense, the focus on public office rather assumes uniformity and precise 
delineation of the scope of that office. This issue is becoming more significant in an era 
when more public functions are divested to private companies, such as prison security 
and transport to court, etc. Of course, this omits from the scope of corruption acts 
between solely private parties, an issue to which I return.  
 
Finally, similar concerns about clarity of definition may be raised in terms of the public 
interest. Needless to say, not every kind of injury or threat to the public interest should 
count as a case of corruption. Furthermore, this concept has manifold legal meanings, 
serving as the basis for legislative tests, the core of some judicial review proceedings, 
and a limitation on rights. Nonetheless, as a potential focus for an understanding of 
corruption the public interest is appealing as it foregrounds the gravity and breadth of 
the harm that is caused by corruption, even if it does not bring us closer to a tightly 
defined notion.  
 
As I hinted in relation to “public office”, the standard view was that corruption 
pertained to the public sphere only.52 In other words, the corrupted individual must 
hold a position of power in the public sector, and so could abuse that power for the 
benefit of a bribe payer, say. Nonetheless corruption is regarded also, though less 
frequently, as the abuse of private power – by this I mean the corruption of one private 
individual, such as the manager of a private company, by another person for private 
gain. This could involve the bribing of a decision maker in a firm to ensure the winning 
of a contract by a particular person or entity. Some definitions speak of “a power-
holder” being induced by illegal rewards to take actions that favour the provider of the 
rewards.53 This is sufficiently expansive to encompass “corruption” of private entities for 
private gain. Moreover, this gain need not be personal solely, but can involve 
organisational gain too. Individualising these behaviours shifts attention away from 
organisational, structural and cultural influences or the nature of the illicit relations 
between cooperating legitimate and illegitimate actors, markets and systems.   
 
A key aspect here is the functionalist question, namely whether the sort of activities 
                                                        
50
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engaged in by the private actor matter. In other words, must the actor be involved in 
quasi-state functions, or do we include what might be regarded as classically private 
actors? The latter is the approach adopted in Article 21 of the UN Convention against 
Corruption, of which concerns bribery in the private sector, as do various policy 
documents.54 Moreover, as Peter Alldridge reminds us, the Law Commission considered 
and rejected some arguments for preserving the distinction between public and private 
sectors in relation to legislation on corruption, looking at the gravity of the harm, and 
the need for greater protection and for higher standards in the public context.55 The 
Commission concluded that differences in gravity, and perceptions of the need for a 
higher standard in public office, should be reflected in sentencing, rather than 
substantive law. 
 
I suggest that the public office component should not be decisive, and that corruption 
can indeed be “private”,56 even where there is no functional equivalence to the exercise 
of public power. This is a descriptive and normative claim, that holds in both the policy 
and legal settings. As noted, some definitions of corruption focus on a “power-holder”,57 
while others hinge on a “trusted position”.58 This could be characterised as focusing on 
potency and expectations respectively. For the purposes of this paper I remain agnostic 
about the chosen core of the definition, given that our choice is likely just to shift the 
definitional burden from power to trust. Instead, I argue that both power and trust can 
relate to the private setting, and that a private conception of corruption, though 
expansive, is defensible.  
 
One who holds or occupies a particular position or role acquires certain responsibilities, 
both in relation to what she should or should not do, and in relation to the kinds of 
reason she should consider in deciding what to do. Corruption can then be seen to 
involve the persuading of a role-bearer to attend to improper reasons, though not all 
improper reasons will be corrupt. So, someone can be corrupt(-ed) in the performance 
of a role that is not a matter of public office. More to the point I suggest that criminal 
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justice agencies and the law should properly take an interest in corruption in roles that 
are not public offices.  
 
So, in this respect I agree with the NCA that a definition of corruption by organised 
crime should take in the corruption of private power holders and trustees. Acceptance 
of this proposition would encompass those in public office or public service such as 
juries, in addition to those in regulated professions and in the private sector where the 
individual is trusted or holds a position of power. Unsurprisingly, this is not an infallible 
means of categorisation, and there may be some hard cases. Some may argue that such 
an expansive approach dilutes the concept by encompassing problematic behaviour in 
the private context. My claim is that looking at the abuse, rather than the location, of a 
role, is defensible in general, and particularly in relation to organised crime. This is so 
the definition conveys the breadth and gravity of the “corruption” of private parties, 
and adequately reflects what occurs in practice. 
 
Support for an interpretation that encompasses “private corruption” can be drawn from 
two different models of the harm in corruption, the first centring on the principal and 
agent relationship and the second on the market.59 Though the preferred model will 
influence the structure and focus of the law enacted, I suggest that ultimately both 
models allow do not differ greatly. Nonetheless, the latter is apposite in capturing neatly 
the wrong in corrupt behaviour by OCGs.  
 
First, the orthodox view of corruption is that it compromises a proscriptive duty and 
thereby offends against the relationship and loyalty between a principal and agent.60 
Here the harm is viewed as deriving from the agent acting in a way that compromises or 
conflicts with the interests of her principal. We can view this as a “shell” or shallow 
theory insofar as the wrong lies in the breach of duty,61 without evaluating the 
underlying normative basis of the duty. The Law Commission subscribed to such an 
approach in respect of bribery, stating “An advantage is a corrupt inducement if it is 
intended to influence an agent in the performance of his or her functions as agent.”62  
 
According to this understanding, an existing principal-agent relationship is necessary 
because the harm derives from an action pertaining to that existing legal duty.63 This 
account limits the scope of the notion of bribery insofar as it is predicated on a 
relationship, which may be difficult to prove, or may not exist. Just paying someone to 
commit a crime is not, without more, bribery. The trouble with relying on legal duties is 
that if this includes duties imposed by contracts of employment those contracts can be 
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drawn so as not to impose the duty.64 It is notable that the Bribery Act 2010 essentially 
abandoned the agent-principal relationship by moving away from the breach of duty to 
an identifiable person, in favour of an intention to induce improper conduct. 65 
Moreover, the OECD has shown increasing antipathy to the principal-agent distinction 
as the basis for the definition of bribery.66 
 
A further problem with the duty model is that it presupposes the existence of a 
benevolent principal.67 It also raises the question of who occupies which role or 
position: is the corrupted state official the agent and the public the principal, or is the 
state the principal? That is the difficulty with the conceptualisation of a fiduciary as a 
matter of public law. Having said this, there may be a distraction in focusing specifically 
on the fiduciary-style duties of loyalty. Public officials may not be required to exercise 
anything quite that strong; it may just be that they have duties to act only on certain 
reasons, or certain interests, in exercising their powers. In addition to these limitations, 
the remedy for corruption under the duty model lies in addressing the institutional 
setting or incentives for the principal.68 Such deterrent or responsive measures seem to 
address only certain forms of corruption, and omit interactions where there is no clear 
or identifiable duty or duty holder.  
 
The duty approach has been challenged by scholars such as Peter Alldridge, who 
reframes the issue as an offence against the market.69 Alldridge argues that locating the 
harm in bribery in that which is done to the principal obscures the real wrong and 
overlooks the range of actors involved.70 He prefers to account for the harm by looking 
at these actors in the context of a market. Unlike the focus on duty, he claims that this 
approach reveals an important distinction between distorting the operation of a 
legitimate market and operating a market in things that should never be sold.71 While it 
may appear that this limits unduly the notion to economic outcomes and forms of 
corruption, in fact it is sufficiently expansive to include the operation of a market in, or 
the commodification of, things that should not be monetised or sold. I suggest that the 
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interpretation of market here is broad enough to encompass a scenario even where 
only one specific transaction is possible with only one buyer and seller, as it involves the 
sale of something that should not be available for purchase or profit. Moreover, the 
concept of a market does not appear to exclude non-financial transactions, as a 
personal gain in power for instance seems a marketised reward for behaviour. In other 
words, this idea extends to dealings that are not purely economic in nature. 
Nonetheless, the market approach could be said to set unwarranted limits on the kinds 
of motive or reason that could be involved in corruption: an official who abuse his office 
out of personal love surely is acting corruptly, but does not seem to be marketising 
anything and so this does not constitute bribery. Even so, in the case of the creation of a 
market in the judicial system (such as a judge receiving payment from someone other 
than her state employer so as to decide a case in a particular fashion) the illegitimate 
transaction is constituted by the mere fact of that advantage and so represents 
corruption.72  
 
Considering corruption by organised crime in particular, I suggest that both the duty and 
the market models are valid, but that the latter is more apt. In any case, a singular or 
unified model of corruption may be unattainable, and so a diversity of understandings, 
and thus responses, is required instead. Corruption by organised crime may compromise 
a duty, but this is dependent on a duty existing in the first place. I suggest that 
corruption by organised crime always satisfies the market model, insofar as it creates an 
illegitimate “transaction”, such as where officials typically are not entitled to consider 
payments, for the gain of an OCG.  
 
Although I do not aim to offer a single or unifying definition, this analysis of corruption 
as it relates to organised crime has defended a private conception of corruption that 
involves an illegitimate transaction. This intersects with but differs somewhat from the 
extant policy definition. Overall, this account demonstrates the multifaceted and 
contested nature of corruption. I now turn to organised crime, as a concept and a term 
of art.   
 
b. Organised crime  
 
Organised crime occupies a position of prominence in political and criminal justice 
discourse in the UK, though like corruption it remains without an “agreed-upon 
definition”.73  And for present purposes, it is notable that some, though not all, 
definitions of organised crime are predicated on the use of corruption.  
 
The meaning and understanding of organised crime differs, between and within the 
academic, legal or political contexts. The term has been said to describe specific 
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structures or organisations that are involved in criminality; the provision of illegal goods 
or services; or a certain type of crime that meets a given level of gravity and 
continuity.74  Finckenauer, for instance, holds that although some crimes may be 
complex and highly organised, they do not constitute “organised crime” unless they are 
committed by criminal organisations.75 One could argue that such a dichotomous 
approach fails to recognise that organised crime involves a spectrum of organisation. To 
this end, Mike Levi prefers the term “organizing crime” to depict profitable crimes that 
need a high level of organisation.76 Beyond this, there are variants of organised crime, 
such as its transnational form, which is organised crime with a cross-border dimension.77 
 
As for any nexus between corruption and organised crime, corruption varies from being 
viewed as an integral part of organised crime to a pragmatic necessity for its survival. 
Some scholarly definitions of organised crime refer to corruption explicitly. Michael 
Maltz suggests that organised crime includes violence, corruption, continuity, and 
variety in the types of criminality engaged in.78 James Finckenauer and Yuri Voronin 
describe organised crime as that committed by criminal organisations whose existence 
has continuity over time and across crimes, and that use systematic violence and 
corruption to facilitate their activities.79 Furthermore, taking a historical perspective, as 
propounded by Michael Woodiwiss, is instructive as it demonstrates how the term 
“organised crime” was once synonymous with local political corruption.80 This earlier 
connection with corruption is striking and demonstrates how readily the concepts map 
onto each other. 
 
For other scholars, rather than being a definitional prerequisite, organised crime’s 
continued existence is based on the corruption of state personnel,81 and the complexity 
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of organised crime may be dependent on effective corruption. As Mike Levi notes, highly 
organised crime is less likely to flourish in the absence of corrupt alliances between 
criminal justice officials, politicians and suppliers of illegal commodities,82 and it has 
been argued that the most successful criminal organisations make strategic use of 
violence and systematic use of corruption to weaken official oversight and law 
enforcement.83 Louise Shelley sees corruption as an operative tool for what she deems 
to be “traditional” organised crime, but similarly “new transnational” crime depends on 
high levels of systemic and institutionalised corruption.84 Likewise, Petrus Van Duyne 
argues that organised crime-entrepreneurs engage in corruptive relations only if the 
risks (such as the sharing of information) are offset by expected advantages.85 In other 
words, the approach of the entity will be context-specific. In some cases, systemic 
corruption might be beneficial to a group, perhaps particularly so in those developing 
states with weaker and less diverse sites of authority. One could speculate that in some 
contexts, especially in jurisdictions with robust rule of law protections and sophisticated 
mechanisms of oversight, the optimal approach would be one-off or “selective” acts of 
corruption because systemic corruption is not needed, and would risk discovery. 
 
Thus, though the two concepts undoubtedly are linked,86 there is divergence as to 
whether corruption is a necessary definitional aspect of organised crime, or a valuable 
facilitating factor. This is both an empirical and conceptual question, to which the 
answer may be jurisdictionally specific. I suggest that organised crime may, but need 
not, involve corrupt acts: rather than being a necessary component, corruption is a 
strategic mechanism used by OCGs. This reflects the nature of organised crime in the 
UK, where it is regarded as not exerting a systematic influence over the legitimate 
economy or the political system in the UK,87 though corruption in other sectors is 
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evident.88 Were we to view corruption as a core ingredient of organised crime, it would 
render redundant any perception and any policy approach based on this perception that 
corruption by organised crime is a novel issue, as we could never have had organised 
crime without corruption. And certainly, such a stance further collapses these concepts 
into each other.   
 
While I have suggested that corruption is not a necessary definitional aspect of 
organised crime, in a domestic policy sense the link is made more and more frequently. 
Corruption is described as a “widely used tactic” 89 and “enabler” of organised crime,90 
and a means of avoiding detection,91 though there is little (publically available) evidence 
for such claims. Notably, the UK’s most recent Serious and Organised Crime Strategy 
moves beyond emphasising that bribery and corruption are tools of serious and 
organised crime92 to state that organised crime is “characterised by violence or the 
threat of violence and by the use of bribery and corruption” [my emphasis].93 The 
Scottish Government makes the same connection.94 Nonetheless, we can imagine that 
such discourse is not likely to preclude recognition of organised crime that relies on just 
one such component. 
 
Shifting to a legal perspective, as yet there is no statutory definition of “organised 
crime” anywhere in the UK. The Serious Crime Act 2015 (which applies in England and 
Wales) criminalises participation in activities of an organised crime group, but the 
offence centres on the notion of such a group, rather than on the criminality itself.95 
Section 45 provides that an OCG has as its/a purpose the carrying on of criminal 
activities, and comprises at least three persons acting together or agreeing to do so to 
further that purpose. “Criminal activities” are offences punishable with imprisonment 
for at least seven years, carried on in England or Wales (or elsewhere as long it is as a 
crime there and is punishable comparably), with a view to obtaining any gain or benefit. 
And strictly speaking, organised crime is not defined in Scotland, rather “serious 
organised crime” is. This is crime involving just two or more persons acting together for 
the principal purpose of committing or conspiring to commit a serious offence or a 
series of such, where “serious offence” means an indictable offence committed with the 
intention of obtaining a material benefit, or an act or threat of violence made with the 
intention of obtaining such benefit in future.96 So it is evident that in legislating against 
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organised crime in the UK, corruption is not mentioned. Were legislative definitions to 
do so, this would complicate prosecutions still further, and so its omission is entirely 
understandable, if unhelpful for present purposes. 
 
Finally, it is worth considering whether corruption can constitute organised crime in a 
legal sense. Corrupt practices like bribery could fall within the remarkably broad Scottish 
definition of serious organised crime in s 28(3) of the Criminal Justice and Licensing 
(Scotland) Act 2010, but not within the more limited definition in the 2015 Act. So, we 
can see that legally, some corrupt acts will constitute serious organised crime, though 
they are conceptually distinct ideas.   
 
 
4. Drawing the boundaries of corruption by organised crime? 
 
These definitional complexities indicate key descriptive and normative issues, namely 
how difficult it is to determine what constitutes corruption by organised crime, and 
what should be deemed to warrant this label. I suggest there is no bright line or 
threshold in this respect. Rather we should be mindful that “organised crime” is a way 
of organising crime,97 and that corruption is a tactic used in this enterprise. Thus 
organised crime could be seen as the site or the source of corruption, depending on the 
given scenario.  
 
Next I examine two issues that are relevant in locating the boundaries of corruption by 
organised crime: one, the distinction, if any, between it and cognate concepts, and two, 
whether the involvement of organised crime in any process or system renders that 
system “corrupted”. 
 
It is useful to view corruption by organised crime as one end of a continuum of tactics, 
with other problematic behaviours located along it. Policy discourse in this area involves 
a spectrum of descriptors, ranging from infiltration,98 through complicity, collusion,99 
through to corruption. This range of involvement is captured neatly in the UK’s Serious 
and Organised Crime Strategy, which stresses that organised criminals very often 
depend on the assistance of corrupt, complicit or negligent professionals.100 None of 
these terms is straightforward or tightly defined. Moreover, it is debateable whether 
the choice of descriptor is important, that is, whether regarding certain behaviour as 
corruption rather than collusion, say, is significant, or defensible. 
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I propose that collusion, complicity and so on are distinct terms, mechanisms and 
activities that should not be confused with corruption. One can be complicit in 
organised crime or collude with organised crime groups without being corrupt; the 
distinguishing element is the position of trust or power that is abused or commoditised 
in the latter instance and the moral condemnation that accompanies the use of such a 
term. That being said, corruption by organised crime always involves complicit 
individuals: complicity is a prerequisite of, though not analogous to, corruption. 
Moreover, while the term “infiltration” may be the appropriate moniker in respect of 
certain activities,101 it conveys a hermetically sealed legitimate entity or enterprise that 
is contaminated by the incursion of organised criminality. This seems like too sure a 
separation in many instances, and does not denote the consensual mode of action 
which is involved in much corruption (save in scenarios where the corrupted individual 
is being extorted). Indeed, in respect of infiltration, one might question what 
distinguishes the actions of an organised crime group in this respect from an aggressive 
or unscrupulous market player. Though each depiction may be empirically apt in a given 
circumstance, I suggest that corruption is the most appropriate generic term where 
there is an abuse of a position of power or trust by organised crime for gain, be that for 
the corrupting group, or the corrupted party. Only this label communicates adequately 
the gravity of the compromising of that position, and the mutually beneficial aspects of 
the interaction.  
 
As I have outlined, corruption and organised crime intersect with and sometimes map 
directly onto each other. In doing so they threaten the traditional demarcation between 
the “legitimate” world and otherwise, as the use of corruption can make it difficult to 
delineate a clear conceptual boundary between organised crime and ostensibly white-
collar crime,102 namely the “abuse of a legitimate occupational role which is regulated 
by law”.103 Nonetheless, as Mike Levi notes, there is increased interest in organised 
crime “enablers” who operate in the “hinterland of crime commission”104 and who may 
be involved in corruption, as well as providing professional expertise.105 So it is not the 
case that professionals are neglected in a policy or strategic sense in relation to such 
criminality, rather that it is seen as a different and separate matter, and labelled 
differently too.   
 
Scholars such as Vincenzo Ruggiero have highlighted the difficulty in distinguishing 
between legitimate and illegitimate businesses and suggest that it is spurious to 
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consider corporate, white collar and organised crime separately.106 Any differences here 
are obscured further by the reliance on and use of corruption. As Ruggiero claims, this is 
not an unnatural relationship between one dysfunctional entity and a harmonious one, 
rather a joint undertaking of two loosely regulated worlds.107 White-collar crime often is 
distinguished from organised crime on the basis that it involves the abuse of a legitimate 
and regulated occupational role.108 In other words, the position of the actor is the basis 
for the distinction. However, the involvement of professionals in providing advice to 
OCGs and otherwise facilitating criminality underlines the porousness of any border 
between the two forms of crime. While I have argued elsewhere that ultimately the use 
or threat of violence that underpins the provision of illegal goods or services permits a 
distinction to be made,109 this is confounded by the use of corruption to replace or pre-
empt violence. One could claim that the corruption itself is backed up by violence, but 
again this does not capture the range and nature of OCGs, not all of which involve 
violence. In other words, these categories of criminality collapse into each other when 
corruption is used in relation to organised crime, indicating that there are not 
analytically clear or useful distinctions. So, whether we frame the issue as the 
involvement by professionals, trusted parties or public officers in the organised crime 
enterprise, or as the corruption by organised crime of such parties, it remains 
predicated on an apparently clear distinction between organised crime and the involved 
or corrupted parties. The continuing description of certain acts as organised crime and 
the exclusion of others maintain the “othering” of organised crime in parcelling it away 
from a “law abiding” and victimised society.110  
 
The next question is whether the involvement of organised crime in any process or 
system renders that system corrupted. In other words, does the granting of a license to 
an OCG or does an OCG’s winning of a public procurement contract constitute 
corruption de facto? I disagree with the NCA’s National Strategic Assessment, which 
speaks of corruption as the perversion of “a process or function of an organisation to 
achieve a criminal goal”.111 This is too broad an understanding of corruption by 
organised crime in the context of criminal justice policy. While an expansive position 
that describes this as corruption conveys the compromising of a legitimate system that 
may occur, the acts of the licensed group in this particular context may not be corrupt. 
Indeed, one could conceive of a situation where the officer or body grants the licence or 
contract without knowledge of the group’s provenance and intentions, on the basis that 
this group has shown that it could do an excellent job. The fact that the entity comprises 
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an OCG might make the decision unpalatable in the sense that it would enable the OCG 
to further its criminal purpose, and may involve “perversion” as noted in the NCA 
definition, but we cannot consider the process as having being corrupted by its mere 
involvement without more. Relatedly, but more broadly, it cannot be said that anything 
an OCG does that relies on or benefits from legitimate actors or processes constitutes 
corruption. The presence of or association with organised crime in an otherwise non-
criminal setting need not compromise a position of power or trust and so is not 
necessarily corruptive.  
 
All of this implies a moving away from the expansive and underspecified interpretation 
of “corruption by organised crime”. Having rejected the NCA’s efforts to elucidate its 
meaning, however, I do not propose any alternative, more restrictive definition, be that 
for policy or legal purposes. Indeed, were I to do so, especially in respect of the law, I 
would need to grapple with the expectations of the corruptee’s trusted position or 
position of power, the meaning of facilitating the abuse of that position for the group, 
and the degree of knowledge on the part of the corruptee as to the nature or intention 
of the OCG. To this end, on the one hand, one could support a robust labelling process, 
on which a strong prophylactic legal regime could be based, while the exclusion of a 
knowledge requirement might risk the criminalisation of those who act from good 
faith/ignorance. But my effort here is not to define a potential offence or to mark a 
clear-cut threshold, but rather to illuminate the problems with and implications of the 
current policy definition and usage. It is not the case that a single and precise definition 
is needed, but rather careful reflection on what referring to “corruption by organised 
crime” entails and omits.   
 
 
5. Concluding remarks  
 
It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which OCGs are involved in or employ corruption 
in the UK.112 Though the NCA states that “the impact of corruption is disproportionate 
to the level and frequency at which it occurs”,113 this claim is hard to verify or dispute, 
given the contested nature of these terms and the inherent difficulty in quantifying the 
nature and degree of corruption. Despite this, what is apparent is an increased 
awareness of and increased policy focus on corruption by organised crime, underlining 
the importance of determining the term’s meaning and scope.  
 
While the breadth of both “corruption” and “organised crime” undermines the 
analytical value of their amalgamated construct, arguably this imprecision is not so 
pressing in respect of policy. One could regard the term as convenient shorthand for a 
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multiplicity of acts, and consider that policy documents cannot convey the conceptual 
nuances of any phenomenon. The NCA’s definition is not an operational one, and there 
is no evidence of it impacting on policing practice. Nonetheless, the mere use of the 
term in the policy setting has a mobilising force and helps to galvanise action. As I have 
observed elsewhere, expansive terms and stretched comparisons are appealing and 
familiar in relation to organised crime.114 Therefore reflection and caution is warranted, 
and some clarity is needed if we are to identify and measure changes.  
  
A further problem with an expansive interpretive approach is of diluting the meaning of 
corruption. Settling on some parameters of corruption by organised crime helps us 
identify and label appropriately the wrong in such behaviour. Describing something as 
corrupt is different to claiming it is illegal or criminal only; the focus moves from the 
breach of a formal rule solely to denoting something about the nature and morality of 
the actor and the breach of the social order. Calling something or someone corrupt 
implies that an entrusted position has been betrayed or compromised.  
 
Framing the issue generically as “corruption by organised crime” is plausible in some 
respects, but this should be replaced with more definitional and operational focus on 
specific areas. As Warren reminds us, there is no one “problem” of corruption, but 
rather “each domain requires a conceptualization appropriate to the kind of corruption 
to which it is susceptible”.115 This indicates that a single definition of “corruption by 
organised crime” per se is not needed or attainable, rather specific policy and legal 
descriptions of and responses to different forms of behaviour. Such context- and sector-
specific descriptors would adequately convey the nature and locus of the problem, such 
as organised corrupt practices in respect of the judicial system.  
 
All that said, as yet there is no suggestion that the conceptually loose term “corruption 
by organised crime” will shift from the policy context into legal discourse. Though this 
may mean that the imprecision is not as pressing and problematic as it could be, we 
should not be sanguine. The identification and construction of the problem of 
corruption by organised crime leads to escalation of concern and demands some form 
of criminal justice response. Existing law in this area leaves a lot to be desired: section 
45 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 manages to be both narrow and broad,116 while the 
Bribery Act 2010 is part of a piecemeal response.117 Careful reflection is needed both in 
terms of political discourse and policy analysis, lest further legislation in this context be 
prompted and influenced.  
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